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Breast pathologyThe media, medical legal, and safety science perspectives of a laboratory medical error differ and assign
variable levels of responsibility on individuals and systems. We examine how the media identiﬁes, commu-
nicates, and interprets information related to anatomic pathology breast diagnostic errors compared to
groups using a safety science Lean-based quality improvement perspective. The media approach focuses on
the outcome of error from the patient perspective and some errors have catastrophic consequences. The
medical safety science perspective does not ignore the importance of patient outcome, but focuses on causes
including the active events and latent factors that contribute to the error. Lean improvement methods decon-
struct work into individual steps consisting of tasks, communications, and ﬂow in order to understand the
affect of system design on current state levels of quality. In the Lean model, system redesign to reduce errors
depends on front-line staff knowledge and engagement to change the components of active work to develop
best practices. In addition, Lean improvement methods require organizational and environmental alignment
with the front-line change in order to improve the latent conditions affecting components such as regulation,
education, and safety culture. Although we examine instances of laboratory error for a speciﬁc test in surgical
pathology, the same model of change applies to all areas of the laboratory.
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In recent years, anatomic pathology diagnostic errors have been a
source of headline news revealing sentinel events involving patients
who had incorrect diagnoses. A sentinel event is deﬁned as any unan-
ticipated event in a healthcare setting resulting in death or serious
physical or psychological injury to a patient or patients, not related license.
1181S.S. Raab et al. / Clinical Biochemistry 46 (2013) 1180–1186to the natural course of the patient's illness. For some patients who
had incorrectly diagnosed breast lesions, the consequences were dev-
astating and resulted in delays in diagnosis with interval advance-
ment of cancer and/or death or unnecessary invasive surgery, such
as a mastectomy for a benign condition. Some of these headlines are
documented in Table 1. From a medical perspective, cases 1 and 2
are examples of specimen identiﬁcation error, case 3 is a communica-
tion error, and case 4 is a cognitive interpretation error.
There are several reasons why these errors achieved such a high
prominence in the media. First, the media focuses on patient out-
comes and understandably, the errors leading to catastrophic out-
comes are important to understand. By highlighting these errors,
attention is brought to bear on the problem. Second, patients place
their trust in physicians and hospitals and a medical error with tragic
consequences sometimes is viewed as a breach in that trust. The med-
ical legal perspective evaluates error in terms of human “negligence”
or the failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person
(healthcare professional) would exercise in similar circumstances.
In tort law, the standard of care is the degree of caution or prudence
required of an individual who is under a duty to provide such care
[1,2]. The media often directly or indirectly portrays sentinel events
as instances of negligence in daily healthcare work activities.
Unfortunately, partly as a result of this perspective, the public and
healthcare personnel associate medical error with incompetence and
react with blame. This view is counterproductive to improvement, as
it magniﬁes the focus on individual responsibility rather than an
examination of all the underlying root causes. In the safety science lit-
erature, medical errors have active and latent causes [3–5]. Individ-
uals may be an active agent of an error in a system that has large
numbers of latent factors that also contribute to the error. Improving
the quality of care does not generally result from telling healthcareTable 1
Internet news headlines of breast surgical pathology diagnostic errors.
Case 1: Cancer-free woman underwent double mastectomy because of lab mix-up
Source: Today.com
Date: October 4, 2007
• In 2006, she was told she needed to undergo a radical double mastectomy
because she had an invasive form of breast cancer.
• “I just broke down and cried,” she recalled of the moment she got the diagnosis.
• The patient went to another doctor for a second opinion, and was again told she
had cancer. The doctor relied on the same mislabeled tissue sample.
Case 2: Pathologist mix-up of breast biopsies leads to unnecessary lumpectomy
Source: Pathology Blawg
Date: May 12, 2012
• The pathologist involved in the case switched biopsy samples and gave the
correct diagnosis to the incorrect patient, which led to a lumpectomy.
Case 3: Case Out of Canada
Source: Pathology Blawg
Date: February 3, 2012
• Interesting case out of Canada….
• Although the pathologist's pre-operative report on the breast biopsy did not
indicate malignancy, apparently it was worded in a fashion that was confusing,
and led the surgeon to believe there was cancer; a mastectomy was subsequently
performed.
• The plaintiff is seeking a total of $2 million in damages.
Case 4: Case out of Canada
Source: New York Times
Date: July 19, 2010
• Nearly a year earlier, a pathologist at a small hospital had found the earliest stage
of breast cancer from a biopsy. Extensive surgery followed….
• Now she was being told the pathologist had made a mistake. Her new doctor
was certain she never had the disease, called ductal carcinoma in situ. It had
all been unnecessary — the surgery, the radiation, the drugs and, worst of all,
the fear.personnel to work harder, more carefully, or “safer” to prevent an
error, but from eliminating the latent factors that contribute to active
failures [6].
This review examines quality, medical error, root cause analysis,
and patient safety improvement initiatives in a laboratory medicine
test (i.e., breast core biopsy) for a patient who has a breast lesion sus-
picious for cancer. Although we evaluate the speciﬁc types of error
highlighted by the headlines reported in Table 1, the framework for
this analysis could involve any laboratory test. In addition to contrast-
ing the ways media and Lean quality improvement practitioners per-
ceive diagnostic errors, another goal of this review is to discuss
personnel and system components of error and the development of
improvement strategies.
Domains of quality
Medical error is best viewed as a patient safety metric in a
healthcare system of multiple quality dimensions. The United States
Institute of Medicine (IOM) deﬁnes six domains of quality [7]:
1. Patient safety — avoiding injury to patients
2. Timeliness — reducing patient wait times and delays
3. Patient centeredness — providing care based on patient needs
4. Effectiveness — providing care based on scientiﬁc knowledge
5. Equity — providing equal access to care
6. Efﬁciency — decreasing waste.
These domains of quality overlap. For example, a “lost” laboratory
breast core biopsy specimen may be classiﬁed as a failure in the quality
domains of efﬁciency (e.g., the patient needs to be retested, which is
a form of waste and results in higher healthcare costs), timeliness
(e.g., the diagnosis is delayed until the retested specimen is interpreted),
patient centeredness (e.g., retesting causes the patient additional incon-
venience), and safety (e.g., the patient must undergo a second biopsy
and its potential complications and will have a lengthened period of
anxiety until the diagnosis is rendered; pain and anxiety are forms of
harm or injury).
A challenge in healthcare is that a quality improvement initiative
that positively improves a metric in one domain may negatively affect
a metric in another domain. For example, an initiative that improves
the efﬁciency of care may reduce the safety of care. Laboratory waste
and inefﬁciency may be removed by improving work ﬂow. However,
this change may inadvertently lead to laboratory front-line technolo-
gists feeling more rushed and stressed. In turn, these feelings may con-
tribute to the development of a culture that is less safe, a latent factor
that contributes to a higher frequency ofmedical error and to decreased
patient safety.
Consequently, quality domains often compete in healthcare systems
with different individuals or system components championing different
domains. Healthcare systems often have misaligned hierarchies, and
the front-line strives for quality goals that are different from the leader-
ship goals. The lack of knowledge of the latent factors that affectmetrics
in all quality domains further results in failures in quality improvement
initiatives that may have untoward consequences in some quality
domains.
Culture plays a large role in driving healthcare organizational
quality improvement. The study of patient safety culture has shown
that healthcare organizations mature through different levels, as the
concept of error moves from one of blame and shame to one of pa-
tient safety improvement. Fleming and Wentzell described ﬁve levels
of patient safety maturity [8]:
1. Pathological — no systems in place to promote a positive safety
culture
2. Reactive— piecemeal systems often developed in response to error
occurrences and/or regulatory requirements
1182 S.S. Raab et al. / Clinical Biochemistry 46 (2013) 1180–11863. Calculative— systematic approach to safety, although implementa-
tion is patchy and inquiry is limited to the investigation of circum-
stances regarding a single event
4. Proactive— comprehensive approach to patient safetywith evidence-
based interventions implemented across an organization
5. Generative — focused development and maintenance of a positive
patient culture; the organization evaluates the effectiveness of pa-
tient safety interventions and learns from failures and successes to
take action to improve.
The generative patient safety culture may take years to develop.
Organizational culture may be shaped by adopted quality improve-
ment methods, as some of these methods involve tools and philoso-
phies that change the organizational and front-line perceptions of
work. As organizational leadership and the front-line focus on patient
safety, the culture of error reporting and improvement shifts from
blame to improvement. Many healthcare organizations have adopted
improvement methods that have been used in businesses, such as
heavy and light manufacturing and service industries. These methods
include Lean and six sigma [9–11]. An overview of Lean methods in
respect to patient safety is described below.
Deﬁnition and causes of medical error
The IOM deﬁned a medical error as the failure of a planned action
to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an
aim. For example, as a breast surgical pathology biopsy provides in-
formation to guide appropriate care management, a medical error
would be an incorrect diagnosis that leads to the wrong clinical man-
agement for a patient with a breast lesion (either a false positive or a
false negative error). Based on patient outcomes, medical errors are
classiﬁed as no harm, near miss, or harm events. The frequency of
laboratory medical error is determined by a number of factors, such
as method of detection, test type, and gold standard for comparison.
The overwhelming majority of general medical and laboratory medi-
cine errors are not associated with an outcome of severe harm.
However, severe harm is a consequence of some diagnostic testing
errors and examples are listed in Table 1. In safety science, a goal is to
detect and understand the causes of error in order to design improve-
ments that may reduce the frequency of error. For all the cases listed
in Table 1, laboratory personnel and other investigators involved in
the diagnostic testing process worked diligently to understand the
root causes.
Investigators use a number of methods to determine the root causes
ofmedical error. For example, the front-line staffmay be trained to use a
Leanmethod of asking ﬁvewhy's to determine root cause [9,10]. Asking
the ﬁve why's promotes healthcare workers' understanding that errors
often have active individual components and deeper system or latent
causes. More complex methods of root cause analysis use categorical
error classiﬁcation or probabilistic error determination. Categorical sys-
tems include the modiﬁed Eindhoven method [12,13], which has been
used in transfusionmedicine and anatomic pathology, and the Ishikawa
ﬁshbonemethod [14]. The different methods provide different levels of
understanding and associations of root cause.
Fig. 1 shows an example of the ﬁshbone method applied to a diag-
nostic interpretation error in breast pathology. The ﬁshbone method
classiﬁes root causes of error into six categories, often referred to as
the six M's (materials, methods (process), machinery (technology), mi-
lieu (culture or environment), manpower (individuals), and measures).
The causes within these six categories may be further sub-classiﬁed to
produce a hierarchy of immediate and dependent causes. As laboratory
tests are categorized by phase (pre-analytic, analytic, andpost-analytic),
earlier phase failures or breakdowns in process may contribute to later
phase failures eventually resulting in an error in diagnostic interpreta-
tion. For example, poor quality specimens (originating from a pre-
analytic sampling problem) may lead to a diagnostic interpretation
error (analytic problem). The ﬁshbone may be applied to each phasein the process to determine the cascade of active errors and component
latent factors.
Quality management system
Many laboratories already have well established quality manage-
ment programs. A quality management system consists of the activi-
ties to direct and control an organization in terms of quality. Quality
control activities are those that assure that speciﬁc processes and
functions meet acceptable parameters, established externally and/or
internally. Quality control activities involve the development of stan-
dards of acceptable performance and methods of measuring perfor-
mance. Processes that do not meet acceptable standards are rejected.
Quality management systems involve all portions of the laboratory
and may broadly be divided into the following components:
1. Organization
2. Personnel
3. Technology/equipment
4. Process control and management
5. Information control and management
6. Occurrence control and management
7. Documentation control and management
8. Inventory control and management
9. Facilities/space
10. Customer service
11. Purchasing
12. Assessment and measure
13. Quality improvement.
Quality assurance involves all aspects of work, which are further
deﬁned below.
Quality improvement
Spear and Bowen described that in a Lean model, work may be
best understood when it is deconstructed into four basic components
[15]:
1. Activities. Activities are technical and cognitive tasks people per-
form. In the anatomic pathology laboratory, these activities include
the accessioning of a breast specimen, gross tissue examination, de-
scription, and sectioning, tissue embedding and sectioning, and pa-
thologist diagnostic interpretation using a microscope or viewing a
digital image. In the ideal state, all activities are highly speciﬁed in
terms of content, sequence, timing, location and outcome.
2. Connections. Connections are the hand-offs or communications
that occur between individuals or between technologies and indi-
viduals. In the anatomic pathology laboratory, these connections
include those between two technologists, a technologist and a
technological instrument such as a processor, and a technologist
and an anatomic pathologist. In the ideal state, connections should
be direct and there must be an unambiguous yes-or-no method to
send requests and receive responses.
3. Pathways. The overall ﬂow of the patient, specimen, or product is
the pathway. In the anatomic pathology laboratory, the pathway
ﬂows from accessioning area, to the gross examination room, to
the histology laboratory, to the pathologist. In the ideal state, the
pathway for every product and service must be simple and direct
without loops or forks. The pathway in laboratory medicine testing
is displayed by the total testing process (TTP) that includes the
pre-analytic and post-analytic testing phases shown in Fig. 2.
4. Improvement. Improvement is an inherent component of work. Im-
provement to activities, to connections between workers and/or
technologies, or to pathways must be made in accordance with the
scientiﬁc method, under the guidance of a teacher, and as close as
Fig. 1. Fishbone diagram of a diagnostic interpretation error. Some of the categorical root causes are depicted.
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is the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle.
The deconstruction process allows individuals to have a greater un-
derstanding of all the components that are inherent in a work process
that produces the right result to the right patient at the right time.
The active components of medical errors are failures in activities, path-
ways and/or connections. The latent conditions that contribute to these
errorsmay originate in thework processes or may be conditions within
the healthcare system that lie beyond thework processes. Although we
donot have enough information to perform a detailed ﬁshbonediagram
to determine the root causes of the errors described in Table 1, past
experience of similar error types tells us that active failures and latent
factors in activities, pathways, and connections and latent factors in
the system resulted in these sentinel events.
Much attention has been placed on the levels and systems of
healthcare and their effect on patient safety. Ferlie and Shortell [16]
deﬁned four systems of healthcare:
1. Patient. The individual patient is the center and ﬁrst level of the
healthcare delivery system and the patients' needs and desires
are the deﬁning factors of a safe system.
2. Care team. The care team is the second level of the healthcare system
and consists of the individual physician and a group of care providers.
The care team is the basic building block of a “clinical microsystem,”
deﬁned as “the smallest replicable unit within an organization
(or across multiple organizations) that is replicable in the sense
that it containswithin itself the necessary human, ﬁnancial, and tech-
nological resources to do its work” [17]. Laboratory personnel are a
part of the care team. Currently,manyhealthcare practitioners recog-
nize that many barriers (i.e., latent factors) limit the effectiveness of
these teams to deliver evidence-based care. These barriers include
the focus on individual patient needs compared to the needs of pa-
tient populations, the lack of supporting information technologytools, the guild structure of the healthcare professions, and the ab-
sence of teamwork training.
3. Organization. The organization is the third level of the healthcare
system and consists of the hospital or clinic that provides the infra-
structure and resources to support the care teams andmicrosystems.
The organization encompasses the decision-making systems, infor-
mation systems, operating systems, and processes to coordinate
the activities of multiple care teams and supporting units and man-
ages the allocation and ﬂow of resources. The patient safety and
quality improvement culture are determined by a number of organi-
zation factors.
4. Environment. The fourth level of care is set by the regulatory, educa-
tional, professional societal and ﬁnancial structures that affect the
performance of healthcare organizations and ultimately all other
levels of the system.
Using this model of levels of healthcare, many of the latent factors
that contribute to error are based in the organizational and environmen-
tal structures. These two levels affect education and cultures, which
strongly inﬂuence front-line healthcare work (i.e., the activities, path-
ways, connections, and improvement) at the care team and patient level.
Lean improvement
Lean improvement methods involve the use of speciﬁc tools that
are focused on the different components of work. Some of these
tools are discussed below.
5S
In the Japanese language, the 5S's stand for seiri, seiton, seiso,
seiketsu, and shitsuk and in the English language the 5S's stand for
sort, set in order, sweep or shine, standardize, and sustain.
Fig. 2. Total testing process. The total testing process includes pre-analytic, analytic and post-analytic phase, each of which is composed of multiple steps.
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cess instructions (standard operating procedures).
2. Set in order. Arrange all tools, supplies, equipment, and process
instructions so that they are easily located. Setting in order elimi-
nates wasted time in looking for necessary items.
3. Sweep or shine. Clean and organize the workspace and all tools and
equipment. This step assigns all work components to proper places.
4. Standardize. Standardize all work areas and job responsibilities.
Work stations and activities for a speciﬁc job should be identical.
5. Sustain. Continue the processes after the establishment of the pre-
vious four S's. Continually review the ﬁrst four S's and determine if
improvements may be made.
Hiroyuki Hirano developed the 5S method within his overall ap-
proach to work systems [18]. The 5S method may be used to develop
best practices, continually challenge these best practices to develop bet-
ter practices, and standardize these best practices within systems. For
example, the errors listed in Table 1 are secondary to failures in at
least one of the 5S components. Root cause analysis would help to de-
termine the speciﬁc process components that failed leading to the error.
For example, the mix-up or failure to maintain proper identiﬁca-
tion of patient specimens (cases 1 and 2 in Table 1) often occurs be-
cause of the failures in all of the 5S's. In an ideal work environment,
the work-place is structured to prevent individuals from working on
different patient specimens (activities and pathways) at the same
time and thus markedly limits the risk of specimen mix-up. ManyFig. 3. Process map of anatomic pathology. The mpathologist–clinician communication errors (case 3) are secondary
to the failure to develop standardized communication methods,
such as checklists that provide standardized diagnoses, which have
well-deﬁned meanings for both the pathologist and the clinician.
Many diagnostic interpretation errors (case 4) also are related to fail-
ures in standardizing diagnostic practices. Many of the latent factors
contributing to these failures originate in the organizational and envi-
ronmental structures of pathology training, regulation, and laboratory
hierarchy.
Observations
In the Lean process, a failure orwork problem is quickly followed-up
with a Gemba, which consists of individuals going to the area in which
the problemoccurred to see thework. In this process, individuals on the
front-line and individuals experienced with Lean methods observe the
detailed activities, pathways, and connections of work processes to
determine steps that are prone to failure. Through observations, the
front-line personnel use another Lean tool, known as a process map to
better detail the components of work
Process mapping
Fig. 3 shows a high level process map of the steps in anatomic
pathology. Each box represents a main step in producing a pathology
diagnosis. We also have included some pre- and post-analytic stepsain steps of anatomic pathology are outlined.
1185S.S. Raab et al. / Clinical Biochemistry 46 (2013) 1180–1186in the process. By using observations, Smith and Raab developed a
more detailed process map of the accession and gross examination
components of an anatomic pathology laboratory that handled
breast biopsy specimens. Fig. 4 is a spaghetti diagram outlining the
ﬂow of a single specimen from accessioning through the gross exam-
ination room, histology, and into the immunohistochemical section
of the lab.Specimen mix-up quality improvement
Specimen mix-up may occur anywhere in the pre-analytic or ana-
lytic steps in specimen procurement, processing, and interpretation.
Smith and Raab categorized latent factors and active events in 335
specimens [19]. Latent factors within the workﬂow included poorly
designed specimen bags, inaccurate and complicated standard oper-
ating procedures, occurrence of unprofessional behaviors tolerated
by leadership, and poorly designed information systems. The near
miss events were a result of active operator failures and included
such events as writing illegibly, matching requisitions and specimens
incorrectly, and knocking over containers.
Smith and Raab found that every specimen, including breast bi-
opsy specimens, experienced an average of 5.8 nearmiss-events dur-
ing just the initial phases of analytic processing. Of these near miss
events, on average, the observers identiﬁed that each specimen had
5.2 latent process conditions occurring in the workﬂow and 0.6
active operator dependent events, occurring outside the standard
workﬂow.
Other latent system factors (outside of the standard work-ﬂow)
included the lack of training, a system overly focused on efﬁciency
and not focused on patient safety, and frequent failures in technology.10
11
12
14
19
34
Regular Specimen
IHC Specimen
Block Filing 
# of Touches for 
# of Touches for 
Total Distance Travelled – A
Fig. 4. Spaghetti diagram of anatomic pathology. The movement withA ﬁshbone diagram identiﬁed a number of causes of specimen
mix-up in different steps of the anatomic pathology process for breast
biopsy. Some of the analytic phase causes are listed below:
• Accessioning error — failure to adopt standard operating procedures
resulting in non-standard activities and pathways.
• Gross tissue examination error— failure to introduce a one piece ﬂow
(i.e., one case at a time) system resulting in non-standard activities,
pathways, and connections.
• Histology block cutting error — failure to introduce non-consecutive
breast biopsy case block labeling or differential case inking, resulting
in failures in activities and connections.
• Pathologist interpretation error — failure to implement a 5S work
space or checklists resulting in failures in cognitive activities.
These ﬁndings indicate that there are multiple causes of specimen
mix-up, and although the mix-up often is secondary to an active error
made by an individual, there is a myriad of contributing factors.
Communication error improvement
Communication science shows that there are a number of steps in
the communication connection between individuals. Communication
breakdown may involve technical components (the accuracy of the
message), semantic components (the precision with which the mean-
ing is conveyed), and effectiveness components (the effectiveness
with which the meaning affects behavior) [20]. For example, the
meaning of particular words may be different for pathologists and cli-
nicians. A pathologist may use the word “atypical” to express a high
level of concern that cancer may be present. A surgeon may think
that the word “atypical” indicates that a patient has a low risk of13
15
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15B
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pprox. 900 Ft
in a pathology laboratory is depicted in this spaghetti diagram.
1186 S.S. Raab et al. / Clinical Biochemistry 46 (2013) 1180–1186cancer. If a frozen section diagnosis during an intraoperative consul-
tation on a breast specimen is “atypical,” the surgeon may think the
patient has a benign lesion and choose conservative management,
whereas the pathologist may actually have been indicating that can-
cer most likely was present.
Barriers in communication may be termed as “noise” and include:
1. Environmental — busy, noisy environments
2. Physiologic impairment
3. Semantic — different word interpretations
4. Syntactical — mistakes in grammar
5. Organizational — poor structured communication
6. Cultural — assumptions and misunderstandings
7. Psychological — attitudes or feelings such as anger.
Communication errorsmay be investigated using root cause analysis
that focuses on these barriers. System design to improve communica-
tion may involve implementing new technologies, using checklists
(e.g., restricting diagnoses to those that have an agreed uponmeaning),
altering environments (e.g., using multiple media in noisy environ-
ments to limit failures in a singlemedium), and education (e.g., training
pathologists in the best practices of activities, pathways, and connec-
tions of communication).
Cognitive error quality improvement
In laboratory medicine, cognitive processes also may be standard-
ized through the use of checklists. Pathology trainees learn tomake a di-
agnosis by ﬁrst identifying histopathologic criteria associated with that
disease. The combination of a number of individual criteria is the pat-
tern of a speciﬁc disease. As pathologists learn, they initially identify
the criteria and pattern through a very structured cognitive process.
Kahneman characterized this process as slow thinking, which consists
of a rational, deliberate,methodical, and logical process of reaching a so-
lution to the problem of accurately classifying the disease [21].
As pathologists gain more experience, they develop the ability to
employ pattern recognition. In this process, they make the leap
from individual morphologic attributes to pattern. Kahneman charac-
terized this cognitive process as fast thinking, An example of driving
home from work illustrates how we constantly use fast (driving
process) thinking, as we do not rationally examine each step in the
process (e.g., Do I turn the steering wheel ﬁve degrees to the right
to turn right at the next road?).
Causes of pathologist cognitive error include failures in attention,
memory, knowledge and fast thinking heuristics (or bias). Biases
occur in pattern recognition thinking, as a pathologist makes the
wrong leap or connection from pattern to disease. For example, an-
choring bias may result in an incorrect diagnostic interpretation if
the pathologist places too much emphasis on the clinical history,
which “anchors” the pathologist to make the leap from pattern to
the incorrect disease.
Like most technical errors, most cognitive errors are secondary to
slips in cognition. Cognitive Lean improvement methods also are
based on components such as standardizing diagnostic criteria and
the implementation of checklists. In some areas, such as transplant
pathology, checklists already are widely utilized. Observations ofpathologists performing cognitive process assist in the recognition
failures and biases. It is important to note that clinicians also are sub-
ject to cognitive errors, which may occur in the pre- and post-analytic
domains of diagnostic testing.
Summary
Sentinel events in pathology are rare and this is partly due to robust
quality management systems and increasing maturity of patient safety
cultures [8]. From a safety science perspective, analysis of sentinel
events generally shows a large number of latent factors that contribute
to an active failure. Quality improvement methods use tools to decon-
struct work into its component processes to determine the individual
steps that are prone to error and to determine the latent system factors
that contribute to these errors. The successful implementation of change
depends on a front-line, organization, and higher system focus on both
the elimination of latent conditions and the organization of work pro-
cesses in better ways.
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